

**FILED**  
IN CLERK'S OFFICE  
U.S. DISTRICT COURT E.D.N.Y.

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK**

★ **FEB 13 2009** ★

BROOKLYN OFFICE

**UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,**

**08-CR-76**

**v.**

**Statement of Reasons Pursuant to  
18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2)**

**JOSEPH GAGGI**

**Defendant.**

**JACK B. WEINSTEIN, Senior United States District Judge:**

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c), a sentencing court is required to “state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). If, however, the sentence is not of the kind or is outside the range of the sentencing guidelines as referred to in 3553(a)(4), the court is required to state the specific reasons for imposing a sentence different from the guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2). These “reasons must also be stated with specificity in the written order of judgment and commitment.” *Id.* Even though the mandatory nature of the guidelines has been excised and they are now “advisory,” see *United States v. Booker*, 543 U.S. 220, 245-46 (2005), the sentencing court must still adhere to the requirements set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2). *United States v. Jones*, 460 F.3d 191, 197 (2d Cir. 2006).

The sentencing court’s written statement of reasons need only be “a simple, fact-specific statement explaining why the guidelines range did not account for a specific factor or factors under § 3553(a).” *United States v. Rattoballi*, 452 F.3d 127, 138 (2d Cir. 2006). Such a statement should demonstrate that the court “considered the parties’ arguments and that it has a reasoned basis for exercising its own legal decisionmaking authority.” *United States v. Cavera*, 550 F.3d 180, 193 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting *Rita v. United States*, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2468 (2007)) (internal quotations and alterations omitted). Although a written statement of reasons pursuant to

18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2) is not necessary when the court imposes a guideline sentence, the statement may nevertheless assist the reviewing court and the United States Sentencing Commission in understanding the reasons for the court's sentence.

On May 29, 2008, Joseph Gaggi pled guilty to count twenty-nine of an eighty-count superseding indictment which charged that between September 2005 and January 2008, Gaggi and others conducted, financed, managed, supervised, directed and owned all or part of an illegal gambling business involving bookmaking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1955.

Gaggi was sentenced on January 23, 2009. The proceeding was videotaped in order to develop an accurate record of the courtroom atmosphere during sentencing and the various in-court factors and considerations that a district court must evaluate in imposing a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See In re Sentencing, 219 F.R.D. 262, 264-65 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (utility on appeal).

At sentencing, the court found the total offense level to be eight and defendant's criminal history category to be one, yielding a guidelines range of imprisonment of between zero and six months. The offense carried a maximum term of imprisonment of five years. See 18 U.S.C. § 1955(a). The guidelines range of fine was from \$1,000 to \$10,000. The underlying superseding indictment was dismissed as to this defendant upon motion by the government.


Gaggi was sentenced to time served and three years supervised release. He had served one day in custody on the date of his arrest. A \$100 special assessment was imposed. No fines were imposed because the defendant does not, and will not in the future, have assets to pay a fine.

Respectful consideration was given to the sentencing guidelines, the Sentencing Commission's policy statements and all other factors listed under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to ensure that the sentence is "sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes" of

sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). A sentence within the guidelines range is appropriate in this case. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A).

The court considered the “nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). The crime is serious because Gaggi facilitated a mafia-run illegal gambling operation. The defendant has accepted responsibility for his actions. He takes care of his children while his wife works. A sentence of time served reflects the seriousness of the offense, will promote respect for the law and provide just punishment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A).

Under section 3553(a)(2)(B), there are two major considerations: specific and general deterrence. General deterrence is achieved by sending a message that organized crime activity will result in substantial punishment. Specific deterrence is not required in this case. It is unlikely that this defendant will engage in further criminal activity in light of his family responsibilities and the aberrational nature of this crime.



Jack B. Weinstein  
Senior United States District Judge

Dated: January 30, 2009  
Brooklyn, New York